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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS < 





Appeal No. 20090866-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(h), which grants the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over "appeals from a district 
court involving domestic relations cases." 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I: After appropriately finding that Bruce's property settlement payment was 
in the nature of alimony, did the trial court err by extending Bruce's alimony obligation 
four years beyond Cheryl's remarriage even though alimony automatically terminates 
upon remarriage as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's determination of the law is reviewed under 
a correctness standard; [the court of appeals affords] no degree of deference to a trial 
3 
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judge's determination of the law." United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49,19, 79 P.3d 945. Though the trial court is accorded 
considerable discretion in the modification of divorce decrees, its decision will be 
reversed if it abuses its discretion or misapplies principles of law. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1981). 
Issue II: Did the trial court have equitable authority, despite the plain language of 
Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), to extend Bruce's alimony obligation after Cheryl had 
remarried? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's decision. See Connell v. Connell, 
2010 UT App 139,1 6, 233 P.3d 836. 
Issue III: Did the trial court erroneously craft an equitable remedy that was 
inconsistent with the relevant law when it extended Bruce's alimony payments based on 
Cheryl's expectation of payment, her separation from her new husband, and her 
presumed inability to repay Bruce's overpayments? 
Standard of Review: "[QJuestions about the legal adequacy of findings of fact 
and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of law, which [are 
reviewed] for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." Van Dyke v. Van 
Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, t 10, 86 P.3d 767. Although a district court is accorded 
considerable latitude and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy, 
"when the trial court has based its ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
4 
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law, the reviewing court should correct the error and provide proper adjudication under 
correct principles of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Olds (In re Gen. Determination of 
Rights), 2004 UT 106, Tfl6, 110 P.3d 666 (internal quotation marks omitted); Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). 
Issue IV: In the alternative, did the trial court abuse its discretion by not 
terminating Bruce5 s alimony obligation on the first day of the month after he filed his 
petition to modify? 
Standard of Review: Although a district court is accorded considerable latitude 
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy, "when the trial court has 
based its ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of law, the reviewing court 
should correct the error and provide proper adjudication under correct principles of law." 
In re Gen. Determination of Rights, 2004 UT 106, ^ f 16 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Ferris, 595 P.2d at 859. 
Issue V: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that whether the divorce decree 
awarded Cheryl a prospective increase in alimony upon the emancipation of her children 
was a moot question, even though resolution of that question affected the court's 
calculation of Bruce's judgment? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present 
issues of law, which [are reviewed] for correctness, according no deference to the trial 
court." Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, ^  10, 86 P.3d 767. 
5 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules, statutes, and cases are determinative to this appeal and are 
reproduced in their entirety in the Addenda to this brief: 
• Addendum A—Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2009) 
• Addendum B—Decree of Divorce, August 3, 2005 
• Addendum C—Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, February 8, 2011; 
Order and Judgment on Petition to Modify, February 8, 2011 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2005, Bruce and Cheryl Cox divorced amicably after twenty-five years of 
marriage. Cheryl retained a lawyer, who drafted a stipulated settlement and decree of 
divorce. Bruce did not retain a lawyer. Bruce signed the divorce decree after minimal 
discussion regarding its terms. The decree was entered by the court on August 30, 2005. 
The terms of the divorce decree required Bruce to pay Cheryl $3,000 monthly for 
combined "property settlement" and child support. The monthly payment was a 
"property settlement" in name only. According to both Cheryl and Bruce, the purpose of 
the monthly payment was to provide child support and a stream of income to Cheryl. 
The evidence was undisputed that Bruce did not receive any real or personal property as 
consideration for this monthly payment. For these reasons, the trial court concluded that 
the "property settlement" was in the nature of alimony. Bruce punctually paid Cheryl 
alimony every month until January 2009. In fact, Bruce inadvertently overpaid by $524 
each month, resulting in a surplus payment of $20,960 by January 2009. 
6 
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In December 2006, just over a year after the divorce, Cheryl remarried. Shortly 
after remarrying, she quit training to become a medical transcriptionist, and she has not 
resumed any schooling or job training since her remarriage. Cheryl did not tell Bruce 
about her new marriage, which he learned about eighteen months later, in June 2008. He < 
retained a lawyer six months later, in January 2009, who advised him that due to Cheryl's 
remarriage, his alimony obligation had automatically terminated, and therefore he was 
only obligated to pay child support for his one remaining minor child, which he did in the 
amount of $695 each month. In February, Bruce filed a petition to modify the decree of 
divorce. The issue finally went to trial on December 1, 2010. 
After concluding that Bruce's monthly payment was in the nature of alimony, the 
trial court acknowledged that according to statute, alimony automatically terminates upon 
remarriage. But, the trial court extended Bruce's alimony obligation based on "equitable 
grounds." As justification, the trial court provided the following reasons: (1) Cheryl had 
relied on receiving $3,000 per month for ten years and, as a result, it was "reasonable to 
determine" that she thought she still had time to finish job training before the monthly 
payments ended; (2) Cheryl had been separated from her new husband for six weeks at 
the time of trial; and (3) Bruce was in a "far better financial position than [Cheryl] to bear 
the loss." Based on these "equitable grounds," the trial court's decision awarded Cheryl 
the equivalent of $ 105,965 in alimony after she remarried. 
The trial court then issued a judgment against Bruce for $32,055.00. The 
judgment was calculated by assuming that Bruce continued to owe Cheryl $3,000 per 
7 
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month from January 2009 through the date of trial and that he had only paid $695 (his 
child support obligation) for the prior 23 months, while acknowledging that Bruce had 
previously overpaid Cheryl by $20,960 as of December 2008. 
However, the trial court declined to address whether Bruce's $3,000 monthly 
payment of combined alimony and child support should have decreased upon the 
emancipation of his son in June 2007. The resolution of this question, which the trial 
court concluded was moot, would have lowered Bruce's monthly obligation by $474 
starting in June 2007. In total, as set out in the charts on page 42, this reduction would 
have lowered the court's judgment against Bruce for unpaid alimony by $19,902. 
The trial court also ordered Cheryl to pay Bruce $25,000 plus interest, as required 
by the divorce decree, for his equitable lien on the marital residence, which was due 
when Cheryl remarried. Bruce does not contest this order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Bruce and Cheryl Cox were married in 1980. R. 369, % 1. They had four children, 
but only two were minors at the time of divorce: N.K. Cox, born on January 8, 1989, and 
T.A. Cox, bom January 13, 1993. R. 56,12. In June 2005, Cheryl notified Bruce that 
she wanted a divorce. R. 369, Tf 2. She obtained an attorney, who drafted a Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement and sent it to Bruce on August 3, 2005. R. 369-70, 
TT 3. Bruce did not retain an attorney. R. 14. 
8 
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With almost no negotiation, other than Bruce requesting a tax exemption for the 
minor children (which he received) and the ability to deduct the mortgage interest on the 
marital home (which he did not receive), Bruce signed the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement drafted by Cheryl's attorney. R. 370, ]f 4. The Decree of Divorce < 
was entered by the court on August 30, 2005. R. 55. 
The Decree of Divorce states, "Neither party shall be awarded alimony from the 
other party." R. 60, ^ j 10. However, it orders Bruce to pay Cheryl $3,000 per month for 
ten years "as and for a final property settlement," which "shall include the child support 
payment." Id. f 12. The base child support payment was set at $1,169, according to the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, for both children. R. 56,1f 3.a. Upon the 
emancipation of the older son, the child support obligation automatically reduced to 
$695. R. 372,^10. 
The evidence is undisputed that both parties understood that the purpose of the 
monthly payment was to provide child support and a stream of income for Cheryl. R. 
370,14; R. 372-73, ^  13. At the time of the divorce, Cheryl was earning $900 per 
month, and she lacked the training or job-related skills that would permit her to earn more 
in the present economy. R. 370, ^ 5; R. 373-74, f^ 18. It was important to both parties 
that Cheryl be supported financially while she obtained additional qualifications for 
employment. R. 370, f^ 5. The intent to provide Cheryl with a steady income through 
monthly payments is evident in the parties' communication regarding the divorce decree. 
When Cheryl's lawyer first sent the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement to 
9 
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Bruce, the letter accompanying the proposed Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement contained the following paragraph: 
You will notice that instead of an alimony payment for the 
length of the marriage (25 years), Cheryl has decided to 
request a $3,000 per month property settlement for ten (10) 
years. This $3,000 amount includes the child support 
payments. This will give Cheryl a steady income of $3,000 
for ten years, which will allow her enough income to obtain 
training so that she can get a job and support herself. 
R. 369-70,1f 3; R. 123. 
The evidence is undisputed that neither Bruce nor Cheryl understood the legal 
difference between property settlements and alimony, the tax consequences of alimony, 
or the basic legal rules governing the termination of alimony. R. 370, f 5; R. 373,1fl4. 
As a result, none of these issues were discussed before the parties signed the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement. R. 370,1fl[ 4, 5; R. 372-73, Tf 13. Furthermore, there 
was virtually no property underlying the property settlement agreement—in other words, 
Bruce received nothing of value in return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over 
ten years. R. 377, ^ f 28; R. 372, ^ 12. But, both parties did understand that the property 
settlement was "crafted to provide support in the form of a stream of income to 
petitioner." R. 372-73, Tf 13. The property settlement provision did not mention 
remarriage, death, or cohabitation. R. 372,112. 
The monthly payment included Bruce's child support obligation for each of his 
two minor children until they became emancipated by turning eighteen and graduating 
from high school. R. 5613.a; R. 60,112; R. 371-72, f 10. Based on the Uniform Child 
10 
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1 
Support Guidelines, the child support amounted to $1,169.00 per month for both children. 
R. 371-72, f 10. The remainder of his monthly payment, $1,831.00, was alimony. In 
June 2007, when Bruce's older child became emancipated, the amount of child support 
automatically reduced to $695. Id. However, unaware that child support automatically \ 
reduced upon emancipation, Bruce continued to pay $3,524 monthly through December 
2008.1 R. 3 7 2 4 1 1 . 
Finally, separate from Bruce's purported "property settlement" obligation, the 
divorce decree equally divided what little marital property the parties owned. R. 370-71, 
Tj 6. Cheryl received ownership and possession of the marital house, which had $50,000 
worth of equity. Id.; R. 59-60, ^ | 9. Bruce received an equitable lien on the property for 
$25,000 (one half of the net equity accrued by the parties at the time of divorce) that 
Cheryl was obligated to pay when: (1) both children became emancipated; (2) Cheryl 
remarried; (3) Cheryl moved; or (4) Cheryl cohabited. R. 59-60, ]f 9. Cheryl also 
received one half of Bruce's retirement account. R. 60, ^J11; R. 370-71, |^ 6. Other than 
these two sources of property, "[t]here was absolutely no other property except the 
parties' vehicles, which were of very little value, and each took his or her own vehicle." 
R.370-71, [^ 6. The trial court summarized the evidence as "overwhelmingly clear that 
there was in fact no marital property, or for that matter even separate property, in 
1
 Bruce's monthly payments came directly from his account at the Credit Union. At trial, 
he testified that he paid the additional $524 per month toward Cheryl's car payment and 
that when she purchased a new car she arranged for the payments to continue being 
deducted from his account at the Credit Union. Bench Trial Transcript R. 417: 32, 66-71. 
11 
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existence at the time of divorce that could fairly be said to be the subject of a property 
settlement" of $3,000 per month for ten years. Id. 
Bruce paid Cheryl $3,524 per month beginning September 2005 until December 
2008. R. 372, f 11. The court did not make a determinative finding as to why Bruce 
initially paid $3,524, rather than $3,000 monthly, but the evidence was undisputed that by 
December 2008, he had overpaid by $20,960.00. R. 373,117. Bruce argued that the 
overpayments were the result of his mistaken belief that he was obligated to make 
Cheryl's car payments. R. 96; R. 79; Bench Trial Transcript R. 417, 32, 66-71. The 
monthly payments were financially burdensome to Bruce. After paying alimony, his 
"take-home pay" ranged between $132 and $2,725, depending on his overtime. R. 79. 
Just over a year after the parties5 divorce, Cheryl remarried on December 29, 
2006. R. 371, If 7. She did not notify Bruce that she remarried. R. 371, fflf 7, 8. 
Although it is not clear that she actively concealed her remarriage, she made no effort to 
repay Bruce the $25,000 lien for his half of the home equity that came due upon her 
remarriage. Id. After remarriage, Cheryl quit training as a medical transcriptionist, and 
at the time of trial, she had not engaged in any other job training. R. 373-74, f 18. At the 
time of trial, Cheryl and her new husband were "separated" and had been for six weeks. 
R. 371, Tf 7. The trial court found that Cheryl was "not planning on reconciliation," but it 
did not make any findings of fact as to whether Cheryl planned to divorce her new 
husband or what sort of settlement or alimony she would receive if she were to divorce. 
Id. Bruce presented evidence at trial that Cheryl's new husband, who works as a control 
12 
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room operator at the Huntington Canyon Coal Fired Generating Plant, makes between 
$68,451.50 to $80,307.25 annually, not counting the income from the gym that he owns 
and runs. R. 80; R. 168; R. 249. 
Bruce learned about Cheryl's remarriage about a year and a half after the event. 
R. 373, ]f 16. However, he continued to pay $3,524 monthly through December 2008 
when, on the advice of counsel that he did not owe the full amount, he reduced his 
payment to $695—the amount of child support then owing for one remaining child. R. 
373, f^ 16. He continued to pay $695 every month thereafter. Id. 
In February 2009, Bruce5s counsel filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, 
alleging a material change in circumstances based on Cheryl's remarriage, the 
emancipation of one child, and the $524 monthly overpayment. R. 374, fflj 19, 20. He 
also asked the court to determine that the "property settlement" was alimony and 
therefore automatically terminated when Cheryl remarried. R. 374, ^ f 19. 
Trial Court's Decision 
The trial court denied the petition to modify because it found that each of the 
alleged changes in circumstance, except the $524 overpayment, was foreseeable at the 
time of divorce. R. 374-75,1fl[ 21, 22. However, the trial court asserted its continuing 
jurisdiction under Utah Code section 30-3-5(3) "to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for . . . distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary." R. 374-75,122. 
13 
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The trial court first held that as a matter of law, the "property settlement" was in 
actuality an agreement to pay alimony and child support for ten years. R. 376, f 25; R. 
377-78, ]f 29. "Petitioner made no case, either legally or factually, in support of a claim 
that the payments (except the child support portion) were anything other than a form of 
spousal support." R. 376, ]f 25. Furthermore, "there was in fact virtually no property 
underlying the property settlement agreement, and respondent received nothing of value 
in return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over ten years." R. 377, f 28. 
Having determined that part of the property settlement was, in fact, alimony, the 
trial court acknowledged that it was "obligated" to determine that the alimony payment 
terminated by operation of law upon remarriage pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-5(9). 
R. 378, ^ f 30. However, the trial court found "equitable grounds to postpone the date of 
termination until the date of trial." Id. 
The court elaborated on three reasons for postponing the alimony termination date. 
First, that Cheryl "relied, in good faith," on the expectation that she would receive $3,000 
per month for ten years, and so "it is reasonable to determine that [she] to this day 
anticipated that she still has some time to complete necessary training to improve her 
earning ability." R. 378, f 31. In support of this finding, the trial court stated that 
"neither party initially recognized the effect of the property settlement characterization of 
the support obligation" and neither party understood or relied on the statutory bases for 
terminating support payments. Id. 
14 
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Second, Cheryl had been separated from her new husband for six weeks and the 
court presumed that she lacked "any present or reasonably foreseeable future ability to 
repay any sums that would be owed if the Court terminated the alimony at the earlier date 
of remarriage, or even effective March 1, 2009, the first month after service of the < 
Petition to Modify." R. 379, | 32. Other than this statement, and the finding that Cheryl 
made $900 dollars a month, the court made no other findings of fact as to Cheryl's 
finances, including the finances of her new husband, who had also enjoyed the benefit of 
Bruce's monthly payments after Cheryl remarried. Nor did the trial court make any 
factual finding about Cheryl's finances. See Record,passim. The trial court reasoned 
that because Cheryl relied on the alimony payments for ten years, and because Bruce had 
"withheld" his alimony payment since January 2009, Cheryl was "without resources to 
repay support if the termination date is earlier than the December 1, 2010 trial of this 
matter." R. 379,1j 32. 
Third, the trial court reasoned that it was modifying the decree of divorce based on 
"a legal interpretation of an ambiguous provision that would work an injustice to [Bruce], 
primarily prospectively, if he is required to continue paying the full support agreed even 
after the last child emancipates." R. 379, ^  33. The trial court also reasoned that Bruce 
was "in a far better financial position to bear the loss" than Cheryl because his monthly 
income was $7,764 and he was also entitled to receive a $25,000 payment for his 
equitable lien on the marital home. Id. 
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The trial court declined to determine whether the divorce decree awarded Cheryl a 
prospective increase in alimony upon the emancipation of her children, concluding that 
the issue was moot. R. 378, ^ f 29. However, the trial court calculated Bruce's arrearages 
assuming that Bruce owed Cheryl $3,000 per month even after his son emancipated in 
June 2007. R. 383-387. This calculation assumed that the divorce decree prospectively 
increased Cheryl's alimony from $1,831 to $2,305 after the first son's emancipation and 
would have increased her alimony again in June 2011, when her youngest son 
emancipated. 
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court made six conclusions of law: 
(1) that Bruce's obligation to make $3,000 monthly payments to Cheryl should terminate 
effective the day of trial, December 1, 2010; (2) that after December 1, 2010, Bruce 
would only be responsible for the remaining child support at the rate of $695 per month 
until emancipation; (3) that Cheryl was entitled to a credit against Bruce for unpaid 
alimony due and owing through November 30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055.00; (4) 
that Bruce was entitled to a credit against Cheryl for his equitable lien in the amount of 
$32,515.04; (5) that a judgment be entered in favor of Bruce for $460.04, representing the 
difference between the two foregoing values, to bear interest at the post-judgment rate of 
2.3% per year; and (5) that each party should pay their respective attorney fees. R. 381. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Having properly found that part of Bruce's monthly obligation to pay $3,000 was 
in the nature of alimony, the trial court should have concluded that Bruce's alimony 
obligation automatically terminated on December 29, 2006, when Cheryl remarried. 
According to the plain language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), any court order 
obligating a party to pay alimony automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the 
receiving spouse, unless the decree of divorce specifically states otherwise. Cheryl and 
Bruce's decree of divorce did not specifically state that Cheryl's monthly support 
payments would continue even if she remarried, therefore, as a matter of law, the alimony 
order automatically terminated when Cheryl remarried. 
The trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on "equitable grounds" 
was erroneous for three reasons. First, the plain language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9) 
does not grant courts equitable authority to extend alimony beyond remarriage, unless the 
decree of divorce specifically states otherwise. Second, the trial court lacked equitable 
authority to retroactively award non-terminable alimony or to modify the decree of 
divorce because there were no extenuating circumstances or substantial and material 
changes that were not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Aim. §§ 30-3-
5(8)(g)(i), (ii). Third, even if the trial court had authority to extend Bruce's alimony 
obligation on equitable grounds, the remedy was contrary to relevant law for the 
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following reasons. The critical elements of equitable estoppel were not present in this 
case, despite the trial court's assumption that Cheryl relied on the expectation of monthly 
payments. Cheryl's separation from her husband did not justify extending Bruce's 
alimony obligation, just as annulment does not necessarily justify extending former 
alimony obligations beyond remarriage. And finally, Cheryl's inability to repay Bruce's 
overpaid alimony obligation was not a need that existed at the time of divorce. 
Therefore, the trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on "equitable 
grounds" should be reversed and this court should conclude that Bruce's alimony 
obligation automatically terminated when Cheryl remarried. 
In the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Cheryl's 
alimony on the date of the trial, December 2010, rather than the month following the date 
that Bruce filed the petition to modify. The trial court offered no lawful equitable 
explanation for diverging from the general rule set out in Utah Code section 78B-12-
112(4) that a modification of a spousal support payment may be made "only from the 
date of service of the pleading on the obligee." 
Finally, even if the trial court properly extended Bruce's alimony obligation, the 
calculation of Bruce's arrearages was erroneous because it was based on an unresolved 
issue. The trial court declined to address whether the divorce decree awarded Cheryl a 
prospective increase in alimony upon the emancipation of each child, holding that the 
question was moot. However, this question was not moot because it directly affected the 
court's calculation of Bruce's arrearages. The divorce decree awarded $1,169 in child 
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support, which means that the remainder of the monthly payment, $1,831, was alimony. 
Because child support automatically reduces upon emancipation, Bruce's child support 
obligation automatically reduced from $1,169 to $695 in June 2007—a difference of 
$474. Therefore, his monthly obligation should have decreased by $474 in June 2007 
because the divorce decree did not award Cheryl a prospective increase in alimony upon 
the emancipation of each child. If the court had recognized the automatic statutory 
reduction in Bruce's child support obligation, the court's final judgment against Bruce 
would have only been $12,147—a difference of $19,902. Therefore, this issue was not 
moot, and it should have been resolved by the trial court before calculating the amount of 
Bruce's arrearages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THE "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT59 IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS ALIMONY, 
BUT IMPROPERLY EXTENDED B R U C E ' S ALIMONY OBLIGATION BEYOND 
CHERYL'S REMARRIAGE. 
The trial court properly held that part of Bruce's "property settlement" to Cheryl 
was alimony because its purpose was to support Cheryl and there was no property to 
divide in the amount that Bruce would pay over the life of his obligation. However, the 
trial court erred by requiring Bruce to pay alimony after Cheryl's remarriage. First, 
according to statute, court orders to pay alimony automatically terminate upon the 
remarriage of the receiving spouse, unless the decree of divorce specifically states 
otherwise, which it did not. Second, the legislature did not grant the court equitable 
authority to retroactively extend alimony payments beyond remarriage. 
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A. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That Part of the "Property 
Settlement" Was in the Nature of Alimony. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently stated that "it is the duty of the court to 
look to substance rather than form" when characterizing the nature of a debt imposed by 
a decree of divorce. Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1983) (internal quotations 
omitted); Erickson v. Beardall, 437 P.2d 210, 212 (Utah 1968). The label chosen by the 
parties to characterize Bruce's $3,000 monthly payment to Cheryl for ten years is not 
determinative of its character. See Beckman v. Beckman, 685 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Utah 
1984) (label "property settlement agreement" was not determinative); Bott v. Bott, 453 
P.2d 402, 402 (Utah 1969) ("It's not the label placed by decree upon payments which 
constitutes them either alimony or lump sum property settlements."). This rule 
recognizes that parties may choose to characterize an alimony payment as a property 
settlement for many reasons, including tax avoidance. See Beckman, 685 P.2d at 1050. 
To determine whether a "property settlement" is really alimony, courts look at whether 
the spouse would have been adequately supported without the award and other facts, 
including the nature and structure of the award. Holt, 672 P.2d at 743-44; Lyon v. Lyon, 
206 P.2d 148, 150 (Utah 1949). The trial court's conclusion that a portion of Bruce's 
$3,000 monthly obligation was in the nature of alimony was legally and factually 
accurate for three reasons. 
First, without alimony, Cheryl could not support herself. A payment or debt 
assumption is in the nature of alimony or support if "the plaintiffs means of support 
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would have been inadequate without the provision of the decree that the defendant pay 
these obligations." Holt, 672 P.2d at 743-44; see also Beckman, 685 P.2d at 1050 ("[I]f 
without the debt assumption, the spouse would be inadequately supported, the debt 
assumption was meant to be support." (internal quotations omitted)). According to the i 
trial court, Cheryl was only earning $900 per month, and she lacked the training or job-
related skills that would permit her to earn more in the present economy. See R. 370, ]f 5. 
The evidence before the court clearly demonstrated that Cheryl could not support herself 
without alimony. 
Second, the purpose of the property settlement was to support and maintain 
Cheryl. In Bott v. Bott, even though the parties labeled an award of $2400 as a settlement 
"in lieu of alimony," the court found that because the purpose of the payment was to 
provide for the support and maintenance of Mrs. Bott it was in the nature of alimony. 
Bott, 453 P.2d at 403. This case is very similar to Bott. In paragraph 10, the divorce 
decree says, "Neither party shall be awarded alimony from the other party," but, even 
according to Cheryl's lawyer, the purpose of the property settlement was "to provide a 
steady income" to Cheryl. R. 60, lj 10; R. 123; R. 369, \ 3. Both parties considered it 
important that Cheryl be supported while she obtained additional qualifications for 
employment. R. 370, \ 5. Thus, the trial court properly found that monthly payments 
were "crafted to provide support in the form of a stream of income to the petitioner," and 
therefore were in the nature of alimony. R. 372-73,^ f 13; R. 377-78, f 29. 
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Third, the trial court properly concluded that the structure of the payment itself 
was in the nature of alimony rather than a property settlement award. See Lyon, 106 P.2d 
at 150. The trial court found the evidence "overwhelmingly clear" that there was no 
marital property, or separate property, that could be said to be the subject of a property 
settlement. R. 370, ^  6. The parties owned a house with $50,000 of equity and Bruce 
had a retirement account, both of which were divided fairly and equally in the divorce 
decree. R. 370-71, ]f 6. There was "absolutely no other property" left to be divided, and 
yet, at the end often years, Bruce would have paid Cheryl $298,461 in "property 
settlement" payments. R. 372,112. Because the parties did not have $600,000 worth of 
property to divide, id., the trial court properly concluded that a portion of Bruce's $3,000 
monthly payments was in the nature of alimony. 
Finally, the trial court properly pointed out that even Cheryl does not dispute that 
part of the property settlement was, in fact, alimony or support. "Petitioner made no 
case, either legally or factually, in support of a claim that the payments (except the child 
support portion) were anything other than a form of spousal support." R. 376, f 25. 
2
 It is not entirely clear how the trial court reached this number. If the court utilized the 
following method to calculate Bruce's obligation then his total should have been 
$302,091, a difference of $3,630 from the trial court's number. 
$1831x21 months-$38,451 
$2305 x 48 months- $110,640 
$3000 x 51 months- $153,000 
$302,091 
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Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that part of Bruce's monthly payments were 
alimony was both legally and factually accurate. 
B. Bruce's Alimony Obligation Automatically Terminated Upon Cheryl's 
Remarriage, 
i 
Once the trial court concluded that part of the "property settlement" payment was 
alimony, as a matter of law, Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated on 
December 29, 2006, when Cheryl remarried. Utah law is clear. Alimony payments 
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse. Ostermiller v. 
Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, H 2,190 P.3d 13; Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1984). The trial court's 
decision to extend Bruce's alimony payments is contrary to statute, case law, and public 
policy. 
In 1979, the legislature codified the legal principle announced by the Utah 
Supreme Court twenty five-years earlier in Austad v. Austad, that "alimony continues 
only so long as the wife remains unmarried." 269 P.2d 284, 290 (Utah 1954). The 
principle has remained virtually unchanged since its announcement. Compare Lord, 682 
P.2d at 855 with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9). Today, this principle is codified in Utah 
Code section 30-3-5(9), which provides: "Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse." Thus, 
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Utah law is clear, if a divorce decree is silent as to remarriage, alimony automatically 
terminates upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse. 
In this case, the trial court erred by extending Bruce's alimony obligation because 
the parties' divorce decree did not provide that Bruce's monthly support obligation would 
survive Cheryl's remarriage—it was silent as to remarriage. See R. 60, % 12. Therefore, 
the trial court should have held that according to the plain language of Utah Code section 
30-3-5(9), the court order requiring Bruce to pay Cheryl alimony automatically 
terminated on December 29, 2006, when Cheryl remarried. See Johnson, 855 P.2d at 252 
("Alimony is presumed to terminate upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse."). C.f. 
Connecticut Nat Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("We have stated time 
and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, 
this first cannon [of construction] is also the last and judicial inquiry is complete."). 
The automatic termination rule has been consistently applied in court. For 
example, in Ostermiller, the court of appeals reversed a trial court's award of retroactive 
alimony because the wife remarried during the pendency of the divorce, and therefore, 
the obligation to pay alimony "terminated before it ever arose." 2008 UT App 249, % 2. 
In Kelley v. Kelley, the parties ended a fourteen year marriage with a sham divorce 
designed to avoid creditors. 2000 UT App 236, f 3, 9 P.3d 171. But, because they 
continued to live together as husband and wife for the next two years, the trial court 
found that they entered into a common law marriage the day after their divorce. Id, \ 6. 
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When the parties truly divorced two years later, the trial court awarded the wife alimony 
for the full sixteen years of marriage. Id. f 10. On review, the court of appeals reversed 
the trial court's order for alimony based on the entire length of the marriage (16 years) 
because the wife's right to alimony from the first marriage automatically terminated i 
when she "remarried" her previous husband in the common law marriage. Id. ^ 36. In 
Russell v. Russell, even though the wife's remarriage was annulled five months later, as a 
matter of law, her right to alimony from her former husband had automatically terminated 
upon remarriage. 587 P.2d 133, 134 (Utah 1978). 
In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court succinctly articulated the public policy for 
automatically terminating alimony upon remarriage: "[I]n the case of a remarriage . . . 
the wife has chosen to look to her second husband for support, and such husband is 
legally bound to support her, and therefore, it would be inequitable for her to obtain the 
right of support from two sources." Cecil v. Cecil, 356 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1972); see 
also Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980) ("[T]he statute is and 
should be directed, to prevent injustice to a spouse who frequently pays through the nose, 
so to speak, to an undeserving exmate."); accord Gary L. Young, Jr., Annotation, 
Alimony as Affected by Recipient Spouse's Remarriage in Absence of Controlling 
Specific Statute, 47 ALR 5th 129, §2(a) (1997) (explaining that the automatic termination 
of alimony is based on the public rejection of a situation where a spouse currently 
receiving alimony support from a former spouse also receives support from a new 
spouse). 
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The facts of this case illustrate the wisdom of the automatic termination rule. By 
both parties' accounts, the purpose of Bruce's alimony payment was to support Cheryl as 
she went back to school in order to develop marketable skills. R. 369, ^|3; R. 370, | 5; R. 
373, If 13. Indeed, Cheryl began attending school shortly after the divorce, but she 
stopped when she remarried. R. 373, f 18. In the four-and-a-half years since her 
remarriage, Cheryl has not engaged in any other job training. Id. Because Cheryl has 
chosen to rely on her new husband for support and maintenance, Bruce should no longer 
bear this responsibility. See, e.g., English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) 
("The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive 
damages on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor a 
reward to the wife."); see also Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292,125, 242 P.3d 787 (one of 
the "primary purposes" of alimony is to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a 
public charge). 
All of the cases discussed above illustrate that courts consistently and strictly 
enforce the statutory presumption that alimony automatically terminates upon remarriage, 
unless the decree of divorce specifically states otherwise. The trial court erred by 
disregarding this deeply entrenched principle of law, and its decision should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXTENDED BRUCE'S ALIMONY 
OBLIGATION ON "EQUITABLE GROUNDS." 
The trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on "equitable grounds" 
was erroneous for three reasons. First, Utah Code section 30-3-5(9) does not grant courts 
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equitable authority to extend alimony orders that automatically terminate upon 
i 
remarriage. Second, the trial court lacked authority to retroactively change the divorce 
decree and award non-terminable alimony. Third, even if the trial court had equitable 
authority to extend Bruce's alimony obligation, the remedy was contrary to relevant law. i 
A. Utah Code Section 30-3-5(9) Does Not Grant Courts Equitable Authority to 
Extend Alimony Payments That Automatically Terminate Upon 
Remarriage. 
It was improper for the trial court to extend Bruce's alimony payments based on 
"equitable grounds/' because the plain language of section 30-3-5(9) does not grant the 
court equitable authority to extend alimony beyond remarriage. See Hall v. Corwell, 
2008 UT App 49, f 12, 179 P.3d 821 ("When the legislature has spoken clearly on an 
issue, [courts] are not free to second-guess its wisdom on the grounds of policy."). 
When the Utah Supreme Court first articulated the automatic termination rule in 
Austad v. Austad, it reserved equitable authority to avoid enforcing the rule where "under 
some exceptional circumstances this result might be so unconscionable or inequitable that 
the court, under its equitable powers would decree that the wife does not lose her right to 
alimony upon remarriage." 269 P.2d 284, 291 (Utah 1954). However, when the 
legislature codified the automatic termination rule in 1979, it did not include this 
equitable escape hatch. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9). 
Looking at section 30-3-5 as a whole demonstrates that the legislature 
intentionally granted equitable authority in several other subsections, but chose not to 
grant any in subsection (9). For example, courts may modify alimony based on needs or 
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circumstances that did not exist at the time the divorce decree was entered if "the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(8)(g)(ii). Similarly, alimony may be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
years of the marriage, if the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify a longer 
period. Id, § 30-3-5(8)(h). Also, courts have discretion to consider the income of a 
payor's subsequent spouse if the payor's improper conduct justifies it. Id. § 30-3-
5(8)(g)(iii)(B). Finally, the legislature explicitly granted courts "discretion" to depart 
from the general rule that alimony should be based on the standard of living at the time of 
separation. Id. § 30-3-5(8)(c). 
In contrast, the language in subsection (9) is audibly silent about discretion or 
extenuating circumstances. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when 
legislative silence contrasts with a consistent pattern in law that expressly authorizes 
departures from a general rule, the legislative silence may be "audible." See 
Congressional Research Service, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent 
Trends, 16 (Aug. 31, 2008) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf; see 
also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 61, 62 (1998) (congressional silence was 
"audible" against a well-settled backdrop of common law); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 
647, 629 (1978) (within comprehensive legislative scheme, congressional silence was 
"pregnant" with meaning). 
The trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation beyond remarriage 
improperly rendered the statutory term "automatically terminates" in subsection (9) 
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inoperative. The primary goal of the court when construing statutes is to "evince the true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature as expressed through the plain language of the Act." 
Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, ^ f 7, 45 P.3d 520 (internal quotations omitted). 
In so doing, courts seek to render all parts of the statute relevant and meaningful, and < 
avoid interpretations that make portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. Id. 
However, the trial court's interpretation ignored the term "automatically terminates," 
thereby rendering it meaningless and inoperative. 
Further proof that the legislature clearly expressed its intent through the statute's 
plain language is the fact that the term "automatically terminates" is distinctly used in 
subsection (9). Other portions of section 30-3-5 do not grant relief until the party has 
established grounds for relief, such as the fact that the former spouse is cohabiting with 
another person, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10); or that the decree of divorce should be 
modified based on a "substantial material change in circumstances," id. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i). 
Subsection (9), however, provides that any court order "automatically terminates upon 
the remarriage." Id. § 30-3-5(9). The unambiguous language establishes that the 
alimony obligation ends upon the occurrence of remarriage, just like the child support 
statute provides that child support obligations are "automatically reduced" when a child 
becomes emancipated. See, e.g., Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, f 11. Because the 
legislature spoke clearly, and the decree was otherwise silent, the trial court should not 
have second-guessed the legislature's wisdom by ignoring the statutory terra 
"automatically terminates." 
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Because alimony automatically terminates upon remarriage, the trial court should 
have retroactively relieved Bruce from his alimony obligation as of December 29, 2006, 
the date of Cheryl's remarriage. In Black v. Black, the court of appeals made this point 
when interpreting a separate provision, Utah Code section 30-3-5(10), which terminates 
alimony upon the establishment of cohabitation. 2008 UT App 465, f 10, 199 P.3d 371. 
Both subsection (9) and subsection (10) evince an "express mandate that the order 
imposing alimony terminate automatically . . . thereby eliminating any future alimony 
awards." Id, | 8. But, due to the amorphous nature of a new relationship, subsection (10) 
"wisely leaves decisions regarding retroactivity to the trial court," while subsection (9) 
provides for automatic termination because "the time of a death or remarriage is fixed 
and easy to establish in the usual case." Id, ]f 10; see also Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, fflf 
11,13 (plain language in child support statute indicating that upon emancipation, child 
support award is "automatically reduced" entitled petitioner to retroactive reduction of 
child support as of the date of his daughters' respective emancipations). 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law by extending Bruce's alimony 
obligation based on "equitable grounds," when according to the plain language of 
subsection (9), Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated upon Cheryl's 
remarriage and the court lacked equitable authority to extend Bruce's alimony obligation. 
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B. The Trial Court Lacked Equitable Authority to Award Non-Terminable 
Alimony or to Retroactively Modify the Divorce Decree. < 
Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify decrees of divorce, however this 
authority cannot justify retroactively awarding Cheryl non-terminable alimony without 
any extenuating circumstances or substantial and material changes that were not 
foreseeable at the time of divorce. 
By extending Bruce's alimony payment beyond Cheryl's remarriage, the trial court < 
effectively awarded Cheryl non-terminable alimony through December 2010, but the 
facts relied upon were legally inadequate to justify an award of non-terminable alimony. 
Non-terminable alimony must be justified by "adequate and specific findings of fact" 
because alimony is "presumed to terminate upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse." 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1993). In Johnson, the court of appeals 
reversed the trial court's award of nonterminable alimony because the justification 
offered—"to assist in the support of [the spouse]"—was inadequate. "To allow 
nonterminable awards to be based on this justification alone would violate the statutory 
presumption against such awards, since every alimony award is necessarily based upon 
this justification." Johnson, 855 P.2d at 252; see also Black v. Barney, 2000 UT App 
369, *2 (mem.) (need and ability to pay do not justify nonterminable alimony because 
these are findings in every alimony award). Like Johnson, the only justifications offered 
by the trial court for awarding non-terminable alimony were Cheryl's need for support 
and Bruce's ability to pay. See R. 372-73, \ 13 (sole purpose of property settlement was 
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to support Cheryl); R. 379, f 33 (justifying extension of alimony obligation on Bruce's 
ability to bear the loss). Neither of these facts overcome the statutory presumption 
against non-terminable alimony awards. 
Furthermore, the trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation was untimely 
because it extended Bruce's alimony obligation after it had already terminated. Alimony 
awards can only be modified before they terminate, and they terminate when all the 
awarded alimony has been paid. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). This case presents the flip side of the rule announced in Wilde. In Wilde, the wife 
petitioned to modify the divorce decree and extend the length of time that she would 
receive alimony. 969 P.2d at 440. The trial court dismissed her petition to modify as 
untimely because she filed four months after her alimony award terminated pursuant to 
the divorce decree. Id. at 443. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling 
because the husband was behind in his payments and had not completed his alimony 
obligation. "[W]hen alimony is still being paid, an application for new alimony is timely. 
. . . The actual date the last required payment is made controls." Wilde, 969 P.2d at 443. 
In contrast to the payor in Wilde, Bruce was current with his payments. Therefore, when 
Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated on December 29, 2006, he had 
already made his last required payment. Under the rule announced in Wilde, December 
29, 2006 also marked the last opportunity to modify or extend Bruce's alimony 
obligation. To the extent that the trial court's order modified Bruce's alimony obligation 
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by extending it or making it non-terminable, the modification was untimely and therefore 
unlawful. 
Finally, trial courts only have authority to modify alimony awards when there are 
extenuating circumstances or substantial and material changes that were not foreseeable I 
at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(8)(g)(i),(ii). In this case, the trial 
court did not list any extenuating circumstances. See Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT 
App 37, ^ [ 11, 86 P.3d 767 (reversing trial court's extension of alimony obligation beyond 
period listed in divorce decree because trial court failed to consider whether the extension 
was justified by "extenuating circumstances"). Nor did the trial court find substantial and 
material changes that were unforeseeable at the time of divorce. To the contrary, the trial 
court specifically rejected Bruce's argument that Cheryl's remarriage and the 
emancipation of Bruce's son justified modifying the divorce decree because both of those 
occurrences were foreseeable at the time of divorce. R. 374, f 21. "Before a trial court 
can modify a divorce decree, it must find that there has been a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce." Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, 
f 12; Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ]f 8, 983 P.2d 1103 (trial court's 
failure to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the 
modification constitutes reversible error). Finally, Cheryl did not file a petition to modify 
the decree of divorce, and yet the trial court's decision effectively modified the decree of 
divorce to award her non-terminable alimony. Because the "threshold requirement for 
relief was not established for modifying the decree of divorce to award Cheryl non-
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terminable alimony, the trial court lacked equitable authority to extend Bruce5s alimony 
obligation beyond remarriage. Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) 
(reversing trial court's modification of a divorce decree because the court's factual 
findings did not establish changed circumstances—the threshold requirement for relief). 
Therefore, the trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on equitable grounds 
was contrary to law and should be reversed. 
C. Even If the Trial Court Had Equitable Authority, It Erred by Creating a 
Remedy That Was Inconsistent with the Relevant Law. 
The trial court offered three justifications for postponing the termination of Bruce's 
alimony payments on equitable grounds. First, that Cheryl "relied, in good faith," on the 
expectation that support payments would continue for ten years. R. 378-79, fflf 31-32. 
Second, that Cheryl was separated from her new husband. R. 379, f 32. Third, that 
Bruce is in a better financial position than Cheryl to bear the loss, and that Cheryl lacks 
the resources to repay support if the court terminated alimony any earlier than the date of 
trial (December 1, 2010). Id. These reasons are legally inadequate. Even when 
exercising equitable discretion, the trial court is bound by the law. Rees v. Watertown, 86 
U.S. 107, 122 (1874) ("A Court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no 
remedy known to the law, create a remedy in violation of law . . . ."); INS v. Pangilinan, 
486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) ("Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and 
constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law." (quoting Hedges v. 
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)); see also Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 
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i 
(Utah 1997) (even when exercising discretion, a trial court "must make the findings of 
i 
fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions"). In this case, the trial court erred by 
creating an equitable remedy that was inconsistent with the law. 
1. Cheryl's expectation does not justify extending Bruce's alimony obligation. i 
The trial court stated that Cheryl relied in good faith on the expectation that the 
support payments would continue for ten years. R. 378-79, ff 31, 32. However, 
< 
Cheryl's expectation of continued alimony payments makes no legal difference in this 
case because the critical elements of equitable estoppel—a statement inducing reliance 
and detrimental reliance—are not present. See Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147, 148 (1979) (no estoppel where the 
plaintiff did not mislead the defendant and the defendant did not change his position to 
his detriment in reliance on representations from the plaintiff). 
First, Bruce made no statement inducing reliance. It is undisputed that if the 
"property settlement" had been labeled "alimony" it would have automatically terminated 
as a matter of law, regardless of Cheryl's expectations. The only difference in this case is 
that the alimony payment was labeled as a "property settlement," rather than alimony—a 
characterization that was meaningless to both parties. R. 377-78, ]f 29. The trial court 
explicitly found that "neither party recognized the effect of the property settlement 
characterization of the support obligation." R. 378, \ 31. In sum, Bruce made no 
statement inducing reliance and the characterization of the monthly payment as a 
property settlement, rather than alimony, did not induce reliance. 
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Second, the trial court presumed, rather than found, detrimental reliance with the 
following statement: "It is reasonable to determine that [Cheryl] to this day anticipated 
that she still has some time to complete necessary training to improve her earning 
ability." R. 378, ]f 31. There are no explicit findings of fact as to whether Cheryl actually 
relied on the expectation that Bruce would continue to support her with alimony 
payments despite her remarriage. Furthermore, the facts do not support the trial court's 
"reasonable" presumption. Cheryl began job training shortly after the divorce became 
final, and only quit her job training after she remarried. So, it is equally reasonable to 
determine that upon remarriage, Cheryl anticipated that she would be cared for by her 
new husband, so she stopped her job training—a characterization that suggests that 
Cheryl detrimentally relied on the support of her new husband. Additionally, as of 
February 2009, when Bruce filed his petition to modify, Cheryl was on notice that her 
steady stream of support from Bruce could soon terminate, and yet she did not take the 
opportunity to pursue any additional job training during the two years that Bruce's 
petition to modify was pending. 
In summary, the crucial elements of equitable estoppel were absent. There is no 
indication that Bruce misled Cheryl in any way, or that Cheryl changed her position to 
her detriment in reliance on Bruce's representations. Therefore, the trial court crafted an 
equitable remedy that was inconsistent with the law when it extended Bruce's alimony 
obligation based on Cheryl's presumed reliance. 
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< 
2. Cheryl's separation from her second husband does not justify extending 
Bruce's alimony obligation. < 
The trial court erroneously cited the fact that Cheryl is now separated from her 
new husband as a justification for continuing Bruce's alimony obligation on equitable 
grounds. Just as annulment does not automatically reinstate alimony from a former 
spouse, Cheryl's mere separation from her second husband does not justify extending 
Bruce's alimony payments. Ferguson v. Ferguson addressed an analogous situation, in 
which a wife petitioned for the reinstatement of alimony payments from her first husband 
after the annulment of her remarriage. 564 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). The Ferguson court 
held that "an annulment of the subsequent marriage should not automatically restore the 
alimony awarded under the prior decree," but that courts could reinstate alimony if "it 
appears clearly and persuasively that is necessary to rectify serious inequity or 
injustice."3 Id. at 1383. If annulment alone does not justify automatically reinstating a 
party's right to alimony, surely mere separation for six weeks cannot justify extending 
Cheryl's right to alimony despite her remarriage. 
Ferguson illustrates two problems with extending Bruce's alimony payment based 
on Cheryl's separation from her second husband. First, Cheryl and her new husband may 
reconcile, or may be collusively separated. Even the Ferguson court acknowledged the 
unsavory possibility that the parties to the second marriage could collusively divorce with 
3
 The legislature later reduced the trial court's discretion by codifying this rule in the 
second half of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), which states that "if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined." 
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the purpose of restoring alimony entitlements. Id. at 1382. Second, unlike an annulment, 
if Cheryl does divorce her second husband, she will be entitled to a divorce settlement, 
which may include alimony. Therefore, the equitable concern addressed in Ferguson and 
other annulment cases, in which the wife lost her right to alimony without receiving an 
alternative source of support, does not apply to Cheryl's case. 
Finally, even if Cheryl's separation could justify extending Bruce's alimony 
payments, the trial court failed to clearly and persuasively explain why extending Bruce's 
alimony was necessary to rectify serious inequity or injustice, as required by the 
analogous case law. As demonstrated in the table below, in January 2009, Bruce had 
already paid Cheryl $52,950 in alimony since her remarriage (not counting child support) 
and had inadvertently overpaid an additional $20,960 from September 2005 to December 
2009. The trial court did not explain why Cheryl was entitled to this windfall or why she 
was further entitled to an additional 22 months of alimony payments at $2,305 per month 









09/2005 to 12/2008 






Total = $38,228 
Subtotal from 
09/2005 to 12/2008 




$2,305 x 18 months 
= $41,490 
Total = $81,772 
Inadvertent 
overpayment 
from 09/2005 to 
12/2008 
(40 months) 
$524 x 40 months 
= $20,960 
Total = $20,960 
Alimony paid after 
Cheryl's remarriage 
01/2007 to 12/2008 
(24 months) 
$1831 x 5 months= 
$9,155 
$2305 x 19 months= 
$43,795 
Total = $52,950 
In short, the trial court did not explain how extending Bruce's alimony obligation 
beyond Cheryl's remarriage was necessary to rectify serious inequity or injustice. In fact, 
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the only mention of "injustice" was in paragraph 33, where the trial court noted that the 
i 
divorce decree "would work an injustice to [Bruce], primarily prospectively, if he is 
required to continue paying the full support agreed even after the last child emancipates." 
R. 379, f 33. Therefore, the trial court erred by crafting an equitable remedy that was 1 
inconsistent with the law when it relied on Cheryl's separation from her second husband 
as a justification for extending Bruce5 s alimony payments. 
3. Cheryl's inability to repay undeserved alimony payments does not justify 
extending Bruce's alimony obligation. 
The trial court justified extending Bruce's alimony payments beyond remarriage 
by saying that Bruce was "in a far better financial position than petitioner to bear the loss 
incurred up to the present" and that Cheryl is "without the resources to repay support" if 
alimony were terminated before December 1, 2010. R. 379, fflf 32, 33. However, 
alimony awards should only be based on needs that existed at the time the divorce decree 
was awarded, unless a substantial and material change in circumstances or extenuating 
circumstances justify modifying the alimony award. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(8)(g) 
(i), (ii). 
Obviously, Cheryl's inability to repay Bruce's overpayment of alimony is not a 
need that existed at the time the divorce decree was awarded, so that fact alone cannot 
justify extending Bruce's alimony payment. And the trial court failed to list either 
extenuating circumstances or substantial and material changes that were not foreseeable 
at the time of divorce. See Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, If 12, 86 P.3d 767 
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(before modifying a divorce decree, the trial court must make explicit and sufficiently 
detailed findings with enough subsidiary facts to justify the court's action). In fact, the 
trial court explicitly made the opposite conclusion. R. 375,122 (remarriage and 
emancipation are not substantial and material changes because they are foreseeable). 
Furthermore, because nonpayment of previously ordered support cannot alone constitute 
a substantial change of circumstances, Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, \ 35, 9 P.3d 
171, Bruce's overpayment of previously ordered support should not justify modifying the 
decree of divorce to extend his alimony obligation. 
Therefore, the trial court erred by crafting an equitable remedy that was 
inconsistent with the law when it extended Bruce's alimony payment based on his ability 
to bear the loss and Cheryl's presumed inability to repay the windfall that she enjoyed. 
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED 
BRUCE 'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION ON THE MONTH FOLLOWING SERVICE OF 
THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION. 
In the alternative, even if Bruce's alimony obligation did not automatically 
terminate when Cheryl remarried, the trial court should have terminated alimony 
retroactively to the month following the date that Bruce filed his petition to modify in 
February 2009. According to Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4), if a tribunal modifies a 
spousal support order in response to a petition for modification, "the effective date of the 
modification shall be the month following service." The trial court's justification for 
diverging from this general rule was clear error. In paragraph 32, the trial court reasoned 
that "because respondent has withheld the 'alimony' portion since the beginning of 2009, 
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petitioner is without resources to repay support if the tennination date is any earlier than 
December 1, 2010." R. 379, f 32. This reasoning does not make sense. Because Bruce 
had not paid alimony since February 2009, Cheryl would not have to "repay support" for 
the 22 months of alimony that Bruce "withheld." Furthermore, ordering Bruce to pay < 
Cheryl so that she can repay Bruce does not serve the interests of justice and equity. 
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Cheryl alimony during the 
pendency of the litigation without any rational justification for its departure from the 
standard rule set out in Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS WHETHER CHERYL'S ALIMONY 
INCREASED UPON THE EMANCIPATION OF H E R CHILDREN WAS CLEAR 
ERROR. 
The divorce decree states that Bruce's "property settlement" includes his child 
support obligation. R. 60, f 12. At trial, Cheryl argued that despite this provision, Bruce 
was obligated to pay her $3,000 per month—meaning that as his child support obligation 
automatically reduced when his children became emancipated, his alimony obligation 
increased by an equal amount. R. 371-72, f 10. The trial court declined to address this 
question, concluding that it was moot. R. 378, ^  29. However, this question was not 
moot because it dramatically affected the trial court's calculation of Brace's arrearages. 
"A moot claim has lost its ability to provide judicial relief to the litigants," Shipman v. 
Evans, 2004 UT 44, f 37, 100 P.3d 1151, but Cheryl nonetheless received judicial relief 
on this issue. 
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When calculating Bruce's judgment, the trial court assumed that Bruce was 
obligated to pay $3,000 per month, even though "[t]hat issue still awaits decision." See 
Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32,110, 114 P.3d 580 (issue that still awaited decision was 
not moot because it could still provide relief to the litigants). The trial court attached an 
exhibit labeled "Final Accounting of Payments Made By Respondent," which compared 
the "amount due" to the "amount paid." R. 383-86. The trial court listed Brace's 
alimony obligation as $3,000 through December 1, 2010, even though Brace's son had 
become emancipated in June 2007. Id, Using this assumption, the trial court issued a 
judgment against Brace for $32,055.00. R. 381, ]f 3. As demonstrated in the tables 
below, the judgment against Brace would have been $19,902 less if the trial court had 
considered and rejected Cheryl's argument. 
Trial Court's Calculations 
Bruce's total monthly 
obligation from 
1/2009 to 11/2010 
$3,000x23 months 
Total = $69,000 
Total from 01/2009 
to 11/2010 that was 
child support (paid) 
$695 x 23 months 
Total-$15,985 
Total from 01/2009 
to 11/2010 that was 
alimony (unpaid) 
$2,305 x 23 
Total-$53,015 
Bruce's credit from 
previous monthly 
overpayment of $524 
from 09/2005 to 
12/2008 
$524 x 40 




Total = 32,055 
Re-Calculation If Emancipation Reduced Bruce's Monthly Obligation 
Bruce's total 
monthly obligation 
from 1/2009 to 
11/2010 
$2526 x 23 months 
Total = $58,098 
Bruce's credit from 
overpayment of 
child support from 
7/2007 to 1/2009 
$474x19 months 
Total = $9,006 
Total from 01/2009 
to 11/2010 that was 
alimony (unpaid) 
$1,831x23 months 
Total = $42,113 
Bruce's credit from 
previous monthly 
overpayment of 
$524 from 09/2005 
to 12/2008 
$524 x 40 months 





Total = $12,147 
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( 
Therefore, the interpretation of Bruce's alimony/support obligation was not a moot 
i 
question because it dramatically affected Bruce's rights. Burkett v. Schwendirnan, 773 
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989) (An issue is deemed moot when "the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants."). The trial court's mootness holding was a clear \ 
error of law and should be reversed. 
Moreover, this court can and should interpret the divorce decree according to its 
plain language, which did not specifically indicate that Cheryl's alimony award would 
increase prospectively when her children emancipated. Alimony and child support are 
separate legal obligations that cannot be substituted one for the other. Although the 
divorce decree did not characterize Cheryl's support payment as alimony, it did clearly 
indicate that $1,169.00 of the $3,000 monthly payment would be child support. R. 56, 
f 3.a. Consequently, the remainder of the monthly payment, $1,831.00, was alimony. 
According to statute, child support automatically reduces upon emancipation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-12-219(1). The divorce decree recognized this law. R. 56, f 3.a. Therefore, 
Bruce's child support automatically reduced by $474 on June 2007 when his son became 
emancipated. The divorce decree did not explicitly say that Cheryl's alimony would 
increase upon emancipation, nor did the trial court's findings of fact justify a prospective 
increase in alimony upon emancipation. See Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, 
fflf 8, 10, 201 P.3d 942 (prospective increase in alimony was appropriate where it was 
explicitly justified based on the three statutory factors that must be considered when 
making an alimony award). Therefore, according to the plain language of the divorce 
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decree, Cheryl's alimony did not increase in June 2007. The trial court's miscalculation 
of Bruce's judgment should be corrected and Bruce should be credited or reimbursed for 
his overpayment of child support from June 2007 through December 2008. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred as a matter of law by extending 
Bruce's alimony obligation from December 29, 2006 (the date of Cheryl's remarriage) to 
December 1, 2010 (the date of trial). Therefore, the trial court's order that Cheryl is 
entitled to a credit against Bruce for unpaid alimony due and owing through November 
30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055.00 was erroneous and should be corrected to reflect 
the fact that Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated on December 29, 2006. 
In the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion by extending Bruce's alimony 
obligation through the pendency of litigation despite the statutory rule that modifications 
to alimony awards become effective on the month following service of a petition to 
modify. Even if the trial court properly extended Bruce's alimony obligation, it 
erroneously calculated Bruce's judgment without addressing whether Cheryl's alimony 
increased upon the emancipation of her children, which error should be corrected. 
Finally, Bruce requests attorney fees for this litigation. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2009) 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children — Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction -- Custody and 
parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health 
insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for 
the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and 
which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is 
covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of 
the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the 
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the 
noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
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for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, 
and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by 
modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the 
best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the 
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered 
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable 
attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that 
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a 
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a 
visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred 
by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-
ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
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(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial In 
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the 
marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in 
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address 
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may 
not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living 
expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that 
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that 
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be 
void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a 
party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
in 
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(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating 
with another person. 
IV 
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Larry B. Larsen (7076) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)467-3331 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT , , , , . 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL LYN COX, 
Petitioner, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
BRUCE ALLAN COX, ) 
) Civil No. 054904297DA 
Respondent. ) Judge: ROBERT HILDER 
) Commissioner: Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
THIS MATTER came on regularly to be heard before the above-entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, the Honorable ROBERT HILDER, District Court Judge presiding, this day 
of , 2005. The Petitioner represented by Petitioner's counsel, Larry B. Larsen, 
submits a Written Stipulation and Property Settlement mutually agreed upon by the parties and 
Petitioner's Affidavit in Support of Decree of Divorce. The Court, having made its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
aecree of divorce @ J 
IIHil l I ~ 
M 
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1. That the Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, the 
same to become final and absolute upon entry. 
2. Both parties are awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, but that the 
Petitioner be awarded the primary physical custody of the children, NICHOLAS K. COX, bom 
January 8, 1989; and TAYLOR A. COX, born January 13, 1993 subject to the Respondent's right 
to visit with the children at reasonable times and places. Reasonable visitation is defined as the 
parties may agree. If they are not able to agree, said visitation shall include, but not limited to, that 
visitation as specified in the Reasonable Visitation Schedule, attached hereto, and incorporated 
herein by reference, as Exhibit "A". 
3. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner as and for child support: 
a. A sum of not less than $1,169.00 per month as base support for the minor 
children of the parties, pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said children 
becomes 18 years of age, or have graduated from high school during the children's normal and 
expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. 
b. The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time 
periods during which a child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written 
agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. 
c. The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to mandatory income with-
holding relief pursuant to U.C.A. 62A-11 Parts 4 and 5 (1953 as amended). This income with-
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holding procedure applies to existing and future payors, and all withheld income shall be submitted 
to the Office of Recovery Services however, custodial (obligee) parent waives mandatory income 
withholding relief. 
d. The issue of child support arrearage may be determined by further judicial or 
administrative determination. • 
e. Each of the parties are under mutual obligation to notify the other within ten 
(10) days of any change in monthly income. 
4. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.15 (1953 as amended), the following is ordered: 
a. Respondent shall maintain insurance for medical expenses for the benefit of 
the minor children. 
b. Respondent shall pay the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by 
a parent for the children's portion of insurance. 
c. The parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical, 
dental, vision and orthodontic expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the 
minor children and actually paid by the parties. 
d. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or 
before January 2, of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of 
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that parent first knew or 
-> J 
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should have known of the change. 
e. A parent who incurs medical, dental, vision and orthodontic expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical, dental, vision and orthodontic 
expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
f. A parent incurring medical, dental, vision and orthodontic expenses may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the 
expenses if that parent fails to comply with the Subparagraphs "d" and "e" above. 
5. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) both parties should share equally 
the reasonable work-related child care expenses of the custodial parent. 
a. The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his or her share of child care 
expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense. 
b. The parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a 
provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall notify the other parent 
of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days 
of the date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive 
credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring 
the expenses fails to comply with these provisions. 
6, The Respondent is ordered to obtain life insurance on Respondent's life, so long as 
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such is available at reasonable cost or through Respondent's employer, in a face amount of sufficient 
size to provide for a monthly income equal to support payments hereunder and be ordered to 
maintain in full force and effect said life insurance until the support obligation terminates. During 
such period, the Respondent is ordered to irrevocably designate the Petitioner the beneficiary on said 
life insurance policy. 
7. The Respondent is ordered to assume and pay, and hold the Petitioner harmless from 
liability on, all debts and obligations incurred by the parties prior to their date of separation, June 29, 
2005. Thereafter, it is reasonable and proper that all debts and obligations contracted by the parties 
is the responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt. 
8. Personal property is awarded to each of the parties as they have heretofore divided 
it. 
9. The parties real property, a home located at 194 North 400 West, Huntington, Utah 
84528 is awarded to the Petitioner be awarded exclusive use and possession of the home and real 
property and that the Respondent receive an equitable lien in said property in the amount of 
$25,000.00 in an amount equal to one-half of the net equity accrued by the parties as of the date of 
the Decree in this matter. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the $25,000.00 to the Respondent when 
the first of the following conditions occur. 
I. The children of the parties reach eighteen (18) years of age, marries, 
or otherwise become emancipated; 
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ii. The Petitioner remarries; 
iii. The Petitioner ceases to use the home as the primary residence; 
iv. The Petitioner cohabits with a non-relative adult of the opposite sex 
in the home. 
v. The Respondent may at his discretion deduct $25,000.00 from the 
Petitioner's share of the Respondent's retirement benefits if he chooses to do so to satisfy the equity 
payout described above. 
10. Neither party shall be awarded alimony from the other party. 
11. The Petitioner should receive one-half (Vi) of all pension and/or profit sharing plans 
or other retirement benefits acquired by the Respondent through Respondent's place of employment. 
12. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,000.00 per month for the 
period often (10) years as and for a final property settlement. Said payment shall include the child 
support payment described above in paragraph 6. 
13. The Respondent is entitled to claim the parties' minor children as a tax deductions. 
14. The Respondent is ordered to pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees, in the sum of not 
less than $750.00. 
15. It is reasonable and proper that the Petitioner be restored the use of her former name, 
Petty, if she so desires. 
16. Each party is hereby ordered to duly execute and deliver all documents necessary to 
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effect the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this 3&~ day of y ^ , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ / / ' 
ROBERT HILDER ^~"" 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies t 
mail, postage pre-paid, this fjh_ 
X a copy, of the proposed Decree of Divorce was sent via U.S. 
ay of /^ATX^JT , 2005? to the Respondent, BRUCE ^ — _
 ? j . _ ~ j , ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ j _ _ _ ».« - ^ . r as aa ^ - , r y 
ALLAN COX, at Respondent's last known addrtefc, 856 Hilltop, Salt Lake City. Utah 84103. 
h <^z 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665 
Attorney for Respondent 
Bank of the West Building 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 7 
Sandy, Utah 84070-2033 
Telephone: (801) 566-9286 






IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CHERYL LYN COX, 
Petitioner. 
vs. 
BRUCE ALLAN COX, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 054904297 DA 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Comm. T. Patrick Casey 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on December 1st, 2010, the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding. Petitioner appeared personally, and by and through her 
counsel of record, Larry B. Larsen. Respondent appeared personally, and by and tlxough his 
counsel of record, Robert Devin Pusey. 
The Court took testimony from several witnesses and admitted exhibits from both 
parties which were entered into the record of the proceedings. The Court then heard closing 
arguments from counsel, and took the matter under advisement. 
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On December 30 \ 2010 the Court made and entered its written Ruling and Order and 
served the same upon the parties. 
NOW, based upon the record and file in this action, the testimony adduced and 
documents received during hearing, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married in 1980, and divorced pursuant to a stipulated Decree 
on August 30th, 2005. 
2. In about June, 2005 petitioner informed respondent that she wanted a divorce. 
Without going into details, the Court finds it sufficient to say that the petitioner articulated 
strong justification for her desire to end the marriage. Respondent was not in favor of a 
divorce, but neither was he interested in changing his lifestyle in a way that might have 
permitted the marriage to continue. 
3. Within an apparently very short time after stating her desire to obtain a divorce, 
petitioner retained her present attorney, Larry Larsen. Mr. Larsen took prompt action and sent 
a proposed written Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement to respondent on August 3, 
2005. Mr. Larsen's letter included the following paragraph: 
You will notice that instead of an alimony payment for the length of the 
marriage (25 years), Cheryl has decided to request a $3,000 per month property 
settlement for ten (10) years. This $3,000 amount includes the child support 
payments. This will give Cheryl a steady income of $3,000 for ten years, which will 
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allow her enough income to obtain training so that she can get a job and support 
herself. 
4. The testimony is undisputed that shortly thereafter, respondent met with Mr. 
Larsen. Respondent requested that he be granted tax exemptions for the children, and he also 
requested the ability to deduct the mortgage interest on the marital home. The final 
Stipulation and Decree shows that respondent received the tax exemptions for the children, 
but it is silent on the issue of the mortgage interest. Nevertheless, respondent's testimony 
that he was not able to take the mortgage interest is undisputed. 
5. The testimony shows that there was very little negotiation regarding terms, and 
that neither petitioner nor respondent had any sophisticated legal understanding of the 
difference between property settlements and alimony provisions, but that both understood the 
purpose of the ten years was to provide a form of support to petitioner. At the time of the 
divorce, petitioner was earning about $900 per month, and that is approximately her present 
income. Petitioner lacks the training or job-related skills that would permit her to earn more 
in the present economy, and the objective that she be provided sufficient support to give her 
time to obtain additional qualifications was clearly important to both parties. 
6. On the other hand, the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that there was in fact 
no marital property, or for that matter even separate property, in existence at the time of 
divorce that could fairly be said to be the subject of a property settlement. The parties owned 
a house, but the house was divided separately from any other property settlement, with 
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petitioner receiving ownership and possession of the house, subject to payment of 
approximately 50% of the equity (or $25,000) to respondent, on the happening of one of 
several events. The other major item of property was respondent's Rocky Mountain Power 
retirement account, which was divided equally pursuant to the Woodward formula. There was 
absolutely no other property except the parties' vehicles, which were of very little value, and 
each took his or her own vehicle. 
7. Subsequent to the divorce, on December 29, 2006, petitioner remarried. She is 
presently still married, but is now separated from her husband, and is not planning on 
reconciliation. She and her present husband have been separated for about six weeks at the 
time of trial. 
8. Petitioner never affirmatively advised respondent that she had remarried, but 
neither is there sufficient evidence to determine that she took steps to conceal the fact from 
him. The evidence is undisputed that respondent has had very little contact with either 
petitioner or the parties' children since separation. 
9. At the time of the divorce, the parties had two children who were still minors. 
The older of the two has since emancipated. The youngest son will turn 18 on January 13, 
2011, and he should graduate from his high school in June, 2011. 
10. As noted above, the Agreement and Decree provided that the $3,000 monthly 
"property settlement" shall include the child support obligation. At the time of divorce, that 
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obligation was $ 1,169 for both children. In June, 2007, when the older child was 
emancipated, the support for one child dropped to $695. It has been the petitioner's position 
that while child support is included in the $3,000 monthly payment, upon reduction of the 
child support amount due, the total sum remains at $3,000, with the payment for property 
settlement increasing accordingly. 
11. In fact, commencing in September 2005, respondent paid $3,524.00 per month 
through December 2008 (a total of forty months), when he stopped paying any amount in 
addition to the $695 child support then owing for one remaining child. The Court notes that 
the parties initially agreed that the Respondent paid $3,500 per month for the period in 
question, but evidence at trial revealed that the sum was $3,524, and petitioner accepted that 
revised amount. 
12. The evidence establishes that in the event the Court construes the Stipulation 
and Divorce Decree as petitioner argues, at the end of the ten year period, respondent will 
have paid a total of $298,461 for property settlement payments. While such an obligation 
suggests that the parties divided marital property, in addition to the real property that was 
addressed separately, in the approximate amount of $600,000, the evidence does not support 
such a possibility, or even a fraction of that sum. 
13. The evidence establishes that the parties did not specifically discuss alimony, 
but neither did they discuss property division other than the house, retirement or personal 
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property already addressed herein. What the parties did discuss, albeit primarily through 
petitioner's counsel, with very limited discussions at that, was a compromise settlement 
crafted to provide support in the form of a stream of income to petitioner. 
14. Neither petitioner nor respondent had any understanding of tax consequences 
of paying or receiving alimony, nor did they understand the rules governing termination of 
alimony. 
15. Respondent suggest that there is at least an implication that petitioner was 
contemplating remarriage at the time the Stipulation was executed and the Decree entered, but 
the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion. 
16. Respondent became aware of the remarriage in 2008, about eighteen months 
after the event. At that time respondent continued to pay $3,524 per month, until January 
2009, when, on advice of counsel that he did not owe the full amount, he reduced his payment 
to the $695 child support then owing for the one remaining child. He has paid only that sum 
every month since January 1, 2009. 
17. Because respondent paid in excess of his obligation for the first forty months, 
as of December 31, 2008 he had overpaid $20,960.00. 
18. About one year after the divorce was entered, petitioner commenced training as 
a medical transcriptionist, but she interrupted that training after she remarried and has not 
engaged in any other job training. She lacks a degree, and she does not have any computer 
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skills. She presently earns about $900 per month as a school resource aid. 
19. Respondent's counsel filed a Petition for Modification on February 12, 2009. 
That Petition alleged a material change in circumstances, and it also requested the Court to 
determine that the property settlement was alimony. 
20. If the Court treats the matter before it as a true modification, then any change 
typically occurs retroactively to the first month following service of the petition, which in this 
case would be March 1, 2009. As of that date, because respondent had reduced his payment 
to child support only, his overpayment amount was $16,350. An accurate summary of the 
support obligations owing and paid is attached hereto for illustrative purposes as an exhibit. 
21. Respondent alleges the following substantial and material changes: the 
emancipation of one child; remarriage of the petitioner; and the monthly overpayment in the 
amount of $524. With the exception of the overpayment, the Court finds there was no 
evidence that the changes were not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. With respect to the 
overpayment, that is factually not a change but simply an occurrence that gives rise to an 
accounting issue, and the overpayment is not in dispute. 
22. Based upon the facts recited above, and the applicable law, the Court first 
concludes that the matter before it is not ultimately a bona fide petition to modify, because 
respondent fails to prove any substantial material changes in circumstances that were "not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann §30-3-5(8)(g)(i) Remarriage is 
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generally foreseeable, and no facts were adduced at trial to suggest that this case differs from 
the norm. The emancipation of one child was equally expected, as was the imminent 
emancipation of the youngest son. The unusual circumstance is that in this case emancipation 
of first one, then both minors, purports to grant no relief to respondent, because all support is 
styled as property settlement. It is this unusual feature that causes the Court to consider the 
Petition on a basis other than changed circumstances. The district court "has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for . . . distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) In his 
Petition, respondent asks the Court to find that the property settlement is, in fact, alimony. 
This request calls upon the Court to interpret a Decree that has governed the parties for more 
than five years, where respondent now argues that continuing the obligations set forth creates 
an inequitable outcome. Regardless of whether the issue is interpretation of the Decree, or 
modification of a purported property settlement, or to more correctly recognize and give 
substance to the agreement between the parties, this Court finds that modification, or "changes 
of new orders" is supported by statute, case law and equitable principles. 
23. The Court first addresses modification of property settlements generally, then 
determines that the settlement in the present case was child support and alimony, or spousal 
support/maintenance. 
24. First, while even true property settlement s are rarely modified, both case law 
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and statute cited above make it clear that property settlements are subject to modification, or 
as stated in the statute "subsequent changes or new orders." §30-3-5(3) See Chandler v. 
West, 610 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Utah 1980) 
25. Second, "when categorizing items in a divorce decree, courts should look to 
substance over form to determine whether the debt [of an obligor spouse to a receiving 
spouse] is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support."5 Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 Ut. 
App. 134, j^26, 183 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008) citing Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738, 
743 (Utah 1983) The Court recognizes that Swallow was a default case in which the 
husband's characterization of the nature of the payment was undisputed, but in fact the 
evidence in the present case was equally undisputed. Petitioner made no case, either legally or 
factually, in support of a claim that the payments (except the child support portion) were 
anything other than a form of spousal support. The entire thrust of her argument was that the 
parties entered into a stipulation, and the parties and Court must be bound by that agreement. 
26. Petitioner cites four cases in support of her argument, staring with Land v. 
Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), a true property settlement case, in which the Court ruled: 
"Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply 
because one has come to regret the bargain made." Id. at 1251 All three of the subsequent 
cases quote the Land language, and all three deal with bona fide property division, not with 
issues of support or maintenance re-characterized as property settlement. Lea v. Bowers, 658 
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P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983); Coleman v. Coleman, 681 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984); and Jense v. Jense, 
784 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1989) 
27. Respondent's cases are more helpful. Starting with a 1949 Utah Supreme 
Court case, the cases instruct that the proper focus of the Court's inquiry is: "whether the 
'property settlement' was really an award for the support and maintenance of defendant's 
wife." Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (Utah 1948) In Lyon the wife received 
$7,800 worth of real and personal property; the husband received about $460 worth. As the 
trial court observed: "Divisions of property between divorce litigants are not normally made 
upon a basis of 1/16 to the husband and 15/16 to the wife." Id. The Lyon case arose in the 
perhaps more common context of dischargeability of a debt in bankruptcy, and it was to the 
wife's benefit that the debt be re-characterized as support, but the underlying principals apply 
regardless of context. See also Bott v. Bott 22 Ytah 2d 368; 453 P.2d 402 (Utah 1969) 
(characterization of debt in contempt context); and Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738 (Utah 1983) 
28. In the present case, if the purported property settlement was based upon actual 
property, and respondent in fact received 1/16 of that property, he would have at least received 
close to $20,000 worth of marital property. Of course, there was in fact virtually no property 
underlying the property settlement agreement, and respondent received nothing of value in 
return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over ten years. 
29. For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the property settlement 
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agreement in the present case was in actuality an agreement to pay $3,000 per month for ten 
years with part of that amount designated as statutory child support as long as it was owed, 
and the balance to serve as support for the wife, or more baldly stated, as alimony. Because 
Petitioner remarried sixteen months after the Decree was entered, it is now a moot question 
whether the alimony/support portion of the payment was intended to increase as the child 
support obligation was first reduced, then terminated. 
30. Having determined that the property settlement set forth in the Decree is, in 
fact, alimony, the Court is obligated to determine that petitioner's entitlement to alimony 
terminates by operation of law upon remarriage [Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(9)], but the Court 
finds that there are equitable grounds to postpone the date of termination until date of trial in 
this case. 
31. First, neither party initially recognized the effect of the property settlement 
characterization of the support obligation, and neither entered into their stipulation relying on 
a termination of support on the occurrence of any of the bases set forth in the statute. On the 
other hand, petitioner has relied, in good faith, on the expectation that support payments of as 
much as $3,000 per month would continue for a full ten years, or until August 30th, 2015. It is 
reasonable to determine that petitioner to this day anticipated that she still has some time to 
complete necessary training to improve her earning ability, but based upon the Court's present 
Ruling, any such opportunity is now foreclosed. 
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32. Second, petitioner is now separated, and she lacks any present or reasonably 
foreseeable future ability to repay any sums that would be owed if the Court terminated the 
alimony at the earlier date of remarriage, or even effective March 1, 2009, the first month after 
service of the Petition to Modify. This Court concludes that petitioner reasonably relied upon 
respondent's commitment to pay her a sum certain for a full ten years. For the foregoing 
reasons, and because respondent has withheld the "alimony" portion since the beginning of 
2009, petitioner is without resources to repay support if the termination date is any earlier than 
the December 1, 2010 trial of this matter. -
33. Third, the Court is not now modifying the decree based upon a change of 
circumstances which would perhaps dictate a specific effective date. Instead, at respondent's 
request the Court is modifying the Decree based upon a legal interpretation of an ambiguous 
provision that would work an injustice to respondent, primarily prospectively, if he is required 
to continue paying the full support agreed even after the last child emancipates. In addition, 
based upon the evidence before the Court, the respondent is in a far better financial position 
than petitioner to bear the loss incurred up to the present. The child support worksheet 
submitted as Respondent's Exhibit D shows his income as $7,764 per month, and he is also 
entitled to receive payment of his $25,000 home equity share from petitioner, plus interest. 
34. Addressing the home equity issue, petitioner was obligated to pay respondent 
his $25,000 share of home equity upon any one of several occurrences, including remarriage. 
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She did not make the payment, and she did not even notify respondent of the remarriage. 
When respondent became aware of the remarriage he could have elcted to take his equity from 
petitioner's share of the Rocky Mountain Power retirement benefits, but he is not required to 
do so. Because the payment has not been made, respondent is entitled to interest on the 
principal from the end of December 2007. Respondent argues that he should receive pre-
judgment interest at the legal rate of 10% for the entire time. The Court agrees he should 
receive interest, but as an equitable matter, the Court considers that once respondent learned 
of the remarriage, he could have received a judgment at any time, which judgment would bear 
interest, until paid, at the lower post-judgment rate. Petitioner is liable for the full ten percent 
from January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008, the approximate undisputed date on which 
respondent learned of the remarriage, and could have received a judgment. The post-
judgment interest rate for 2008 was 5.42%. An accurate summary of the princifjpand interest 
calculations is attached hereto for illustrative purposes as an exhibit. 
35. This case imposes burdens on both parties. The issue presented raised 
meritorious arguments on both sides. Respondent is the prevailing party, and petitioner has 
the greater financial need. In light of these countervailing factors, none of which mandate a 
fee award, the Court determines that it is equitable that each party bear his and her own fees 
and costs. 
NOW, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the 
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following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Respondent's obligation to make the $3,000 per month payments to petitioner 
as previously set forth in the Decree of Divorce should terminate effective the date of trial, 
December 1,2010. 
2. On and after that date respondent should be responsible for only the child 
support due the remaining child at the rate of $695.00 per month, payable for the term set 
forth in the Decree of Divorce. 
3. Petitioner is entitled to a credit against respondent for unpaid alimony due and 
owing through November 30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055.00. 
4. Respondent is entitled to a credit against petitioner for his equitable lien on the 
former marital residence and interest thereupon in the amount of $32,515.04. 
5. Judgment should enter in favor of respondent and against petitioner in the 
amount of $460.04, representing the difference between to foregoing values, to bear interest at 
the post-judgment rate ofjpS5Hs» per annum. 
6. Each party should be ordered to assume and pay their respective attorney's fees 
and costs incurred in this matter. 
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DATED this .2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED as to form & content 
this J [ ^ d a v o f J W , ^ 2 0 H . 
LARRY B.LARjSJ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
^ 
RULE 7(T)(7) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I served a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 
^ S day of January, 2011, to: 
LARRY B. LARSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
352Ji^9^^ouiii 
/Sal tLake City, UT J^ LA-HC" 
~~> 
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FINAL ACCOUNTING OF PAYMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT 








































































Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 






































































































Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
June $3,000 $3,524 $524 $17,816 
July $3,000 $3,524 $524 $18,340 
August $3,000 $3,524 $524 $18,864 
September $3,000 $3,524 $524 $19,388 
October $3,000 $3,524 $524 $19,912 
November $3,000 $3,524 $524 $20,436 
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COX v. COX 
Civil No. 054904297 DA 
HOME EQUITY SUMMARY 
$25,000 DUE ON PETITIONER'S REMARRIAGE 
Date of remarriage - December 29th, 2006 
—oooOooo— 
Pre-judgment interest at 10% [UCA§ 15-1-1(2)] 
until June 30th, 2008 
$25,000.00 
Annual interest = $2,500.00 < 
Daily rate = $6,849 
January 1st, 2007 through June 30, 2008 
< 
547 days @ $6.849/day = $2,312.93 $3,746.40 
SUBTOTAL THIS PERIOD: $28,746.40 < 
< 
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—oooOooo— 
Post-judgment interest at 5.42% 
until December 1st, 2010 
Carry over amount: $28,746.40 
Annual interest = $1,558.05 
Daily rate = $4,268 
June 30, 2008 through December 1st, 2010 
883 days @ $4,268/ day = $3,768.64 
SUBTOTAL THIS PERIOD: $3,768.64 
TOTAL CLAIM FOR EQUITY THROUGH TRIAL DATE: $32,515.04 
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